The story of 1968, of the Prague Spring of hopes of reform, and the Prague Fall, of Soviet tanks invading in August, has become much better known after the velvet and other revolutions swept the socialist systems of Eastern Europe and hitherto closely guarded archives became accessible to historians. Still, many blank spots remain. We still do not know why the Soviet leadership urged the departure of Antonin Novotny, the tried and proven dogmatic leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, with such vehemence, albeit well aware of the dangers of thereby strengthening the reformists in Prague and Bratislava, who demanded his replacement. When and why did his unexpected successor, Alexander DubcŠek, who had earlier been proud of his Soviet past, realize that the role of a puppet whose strings were held by the Kremlin suited him
less and less? How did his Hungarian
colleague, János Kádár, manage to manoeuvre so cleverly between Moscow and Prague that many believe to this day that he uneasily agreed to take part in the August joint action of the Warsaw Treaty states only because he felt anxious about the fate of the Hungarian way of reforms? That intervention too was much more drastic and bloody than we had been aware of so far. These are the aspects from which I approached the 1968 Czechoslovak events, relying almost exclusively on hitherto unpublished archival sources.

Hungarian politicians showed great restraint at international forums, but did occasionally support Moscow in the manner of their counterparts in East Berlin, Warsaw, Sofia, and, up to spring 1968, in Prague. However, in top-level—always verbal—instructions, a few high-ranking Hun-garian diplomats cleverly let it be known in certain capitals (London, Paris, Belgrade) that they could not always act as they wished. In addition, the Hungarian media initially handled the Czechoslovak events with greater subtlety than the media in the rest of the socialist camp.1
One of the reasons for this was that the Kádár leadership understood that, barely twelve years after the crushing of the 1956 Revolution, a considerable number of Hungarians looked on the Prague Spring with sympathy. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) leadership was also aware that the aims of the Czechoslovak “new economic mechanism” had much in common with the identically named Hungarian economic policy introduced in January 1968. In connection with this, in spring 1968 there were cautious feelers about the reaction in the West to a possible Budapest-Prague-Belgrade axis based on closer economic cooperation, which would have opened the way to trade relations independent of Comecon.2 The Hungarian military leadership also showed understanding toward its Czech and Slovak counterparts during “Operation Sumava” (June–July 1968), a Warsaw Pact exercise held on the territory of four countries, virtually for the purpose of taking temporary occupation of important Czechoslovak regions.3 Furthermore, János Kádár’s speeches concerning the Czechoslovak situation also seemed conciliatory both at the Dresden conference of the “Six” in March—which the Communist Party of Czechslovakia (CPCS) delegation attended—and at the Moscow (May) and Warsaw (July) discussions of the “Five” —which it did not. The keynote of these speeches and of those at the HSWP Central Committee meetings was in many ways the same: the Czechs are not yet on the verge of an open counterrevolution, said Kádár, therefore it is advisable to resolve conflicts through “domestic political solution,” rather than through armed intervention.4
During the first months of 1968 Kádár sympathized more with DubcŠek than Novotny, the former First Secretary, who had behaved arrogantly with the Hungarian leadership at the end of 1956 and in early 1957. The Hungarian party leader found it psychologically satisfying to be giving “paternal” advice to DubcŠek, a man less experienced and ten years his junior. It pleased him to expound his favourite notion of the necessity of engaging in a two-front struggle against sectarian and revisionist forces, and he also took the opportunity to warn the younger man against needless confrontation of the Kremlin.5
On the basis of recollections of conversations, Kádár’s behaviour in 1968 has been judged to date in East- and Central-European countries, and primarily in Hungary, to have been more sympathetic to DubcŠek than that of the other party leaders. However, there is a flaw in this image, namely, that the documents that have become accessible in the Soviet Union and Hungary show that every time before his “spontaneous conversations” with DubcŠek, the Hungarian leader discussed the main issues with Brezhnev over the phone or through mediators, providing a detailed report afterward. On occasion, at the Kremlin’s request, he pretended “to give his own well-intentioned opinion” when he told the CPCS leaders things that would have been akward for Brezhnev himself to say,6 as for instance, that the Russians would have to adopt a harder line in case they were not ready to go along, etc. In spite of his native common sense and long years in the party apparatus, DubcŠek failed to notice that his paternal Hungarian friend was playing with loaded dice. After the Velvet Revolution—when he had the opportunity to read archival documents revealing Kádár’s duplicity—he bitterly
remarked: “Now I know that Kádár met
me on Brezhnev’s instructions. And I also know that he was as much a product of ‘Leninist morality’ as the others.”7
DubcŠek probably learned from these documents that Brezhnev all but ordered Kádár, before the latter’s visit to Moscow at the end of January 1968, to talk informally to the new CPCS leader, and then inform the Soviet leaders of his impressions. At the meeting near Nové Zámky on January 10, DubcŠek and Kádár sought to discover each other’s intentions. Their discussions, recorded by their associates, was made up of long monologues, after which DubcŠek returned to Prague evidently under the impression that he had an ally in Kádár. The latter, on the other hand, came to the conclusion that the tug-of-war between DubcŠek and Novotny was far from over, and that the course of the Czechoslovak reform process would be rough.8
During the ensuing weeks, the Kremlin decided on a wait and see stance. Kádár, too, decided not to sound the alarm. In any case, Moscow and Budapest were more concerned at this time with Romania’s policy of going her own way and with the situation in Poland. However, diplomats and KGB agents in Prague did not let the Soviet leadership’s attention waver, bombarding it daily with reports of the impending “loss” of Czechoslovakia.9 In addition, at the beginning of February, DubcŠek and his followers resorted to a clever move—using the Kremlin—in trying to permanently sideline Novotny, who
was engaged in a last-ditch battle to retain his influence. This is what the “memo”, written in the usual party jargon on Brezhnev’s phone conversation with Kádár on February 13, 1968, indicates:

During Comrade DubcŠek’s Moscow visit they agreed to send a delegation to the Czechoslovak celebrations led by a P[olit]-b[uro] member (they had Comrade Podgorny in mind). They have now received a coded telegramme from Comrade DubcŠek, explicitly asking—for domestic and foreign policy reasons—that Comrade Brezhnev lead the Soviet delegation... Comrade Zhivkov said that if Comrade Brezhnev goes to Prague, he’ll go, too. Comrade Gomulka, who is chairing the Central Committee plenum just at that time, finds the question hard to solve, but they will discuss it all the same and he’ll give his answer to Comrade Brezhnev tonight.
Comrade Brezhnev asked that Comrade Kádár also come to Prague, even if for only a day.10

The telephone lines connecting the socialist capitals were overheating. After lengthy consultations, every Central and East-European communist leader, except Tito, attended the celebrations commemorating the 20th anniversary of the February 1948 events in Prague. However, DubcŠek, who hoped to bolster his own legitimacy by this event, was greatly disappointed. The fact was that the guests who viewed Czechoslovak reforms with hostility from the start were flooded by complaints from the dogmatic Czech and Slovak politicians. None of the speakers—DubcŠek included—questioned the grounds for celebrating this spectacular anniversary, the commemoration of the day when in 1948 armed bands and Soviet diplomatic pressure together produced the end of parliamentary democracy in Czechoslovakia.
A few days after the Prague celebrations, the leaders of the socialist countries met again in Sofia at the usual Warsaw Pact conference where, also under the influence of their Czechoslovak impressions, they discussed the latest news from there with increased anxiety. During the break they all saw Brezhnev, urging him to do something about Czechoslovakia. By this time, János Kádár, along with Gomulka and Zhivkov,11 was arguing against DubcŠek. Later, in their absence, Brezhnev blamed them for not telling him what exactly they meant by “restoring order”. Nevertheless, the simple pledge of support from its allies came in handy for the Kremlin, since henceforth Brezhnev could safely refer to the “collective will” of the socialist countries when taking steps against DubcŠek. But following the Sofia summit—where he made many solemn promises to “control the situation” soon if only they would leave him alone for a while—DubcŠek started to play hide and seek. Sometimes, without giving a reason, he did not take Brezhnev’s calls. Sometimes, he reported sick like a reluctant student before a test. At other times, he avoided meeting the Soviet Ambassador, Stepan Chervonenko, who spent hours in the antechamber waiting to see him. Something that Novotny, this “cunning old fox”, as his Soviet partners called him, would never have dared.12
Strangely enough, over the next few months this childish tactic of gaining time often worked. In this way, the first secretary of the CPCS Central Committee managed to avoid being ordered to report to Moscow on three occasions: in April, June and July 1968. At the same time, he also undermined the remaining respect he still commanded in the Kremlin. Furthermore, the total failure to “hem in” DubcŠek made Brezhnev draw Kádár into this peculiar game. In March already, the Kremlin, with Kádár’s assistance, tried to force DubcŠek to sit down to negotiate, the idea being to make him curb the “licentiousness” of the printed and electronic media and to reinstitute censorship which, by then, existed only on paper, to limit the liberal economic reforms that had gone in the direction of capitalism, as well as a cultural policy promoting “outmoded bourgeois values”. But, even more important than these changes, was the Kremlin’s demand that DubcŠek stop the dismissal of the Czech and Slovak nomenklatura.13
The fact that Leonid Brezhnev called his Hungarian counterpart eight times, sometimes twice a day, between March 11 and 19, 1968, is indicative of the Soviet leadership’s unease. Kádár, who did not speak Russian and relied on an interpreter in private conversations, often left a message for Brezhnev the same day or the next if he wanted something clarified. The two politicians, accustomed to the party norms of the Stalin era, were convinced the line was tapped. For this reason, they mostly talked in—actually quite transparent—riddles; in addition, long sections of the conversations were often left out of the “memoranda” written afterwards. On the eve of the armed intervention they decided to send their trusted men to each other rather
than discuss the possibilities of curbing the “Czechs”14 over the telephone. The “memos” of these discussions show that East Berlin and Warsaw at this time supported a solution resembling the sub-
sequently adopted “Cierna” variant. In other words, they proposed that the entire Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership meet in person. Kádár, on the other hand, thought that “...The Soviet comrades cannot agree to this.”15
The Soviet leader did, in fact, come up with another idea, that, “the first secretaries, premiers, and the Central Planning Office chairmen of the six countries would go to Prague” to discuss economic cooperation. It was a transparent pretext and met with Kádár’s disapproval. He thought it was inadvisable to go to Prague again, but at the same time it was “necessary to tell Comrade DubcŠek the truth.” For this reason, “Comrade Kádár proposed Uzhgorod in the Ukraine, [as the meeting place], with only the first secretaries attending. It would also seem feasible to have the representatives of not six, but only four countries (the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) meet over the weekend.”16
This meeting of the Four proved abortive. Meanwhile, Wladyslaw Gomulka came forth with his compromise proposal of meeting in Moravská Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, instead of Uzhhorod. “Together with Comrade DubcŠek, Comrade Novotny would also take part” at this meeting.17 Perhaps this was why the multilateral negotiations came to a standstill. Due to the speeding up of events, which soon became uncontrollable, panic seized the Kremlin. The Soviet leadership was dismayed when DubcŠek removed Defense Minister Lomsky without their prior approval. Brezhnev asked Kádár to go to Brno in Moravia, where DubcŠek was addressing a district party conference, and convey their “shared misgivings”.18 On March 16 the Soviet leader spoke to Kádár more affably than ever before in order to get him to consent: “Comrade DubcŠek… suggested that he would call Comrade Kádár, and perhaps come to Hungary for discussions. It was noticeable that he was looking forward to meeting Comrade Kádár, he was feeling good about it as their relationship is very good and the trust is complete.
According to Comrade Brezhnev, this meeting would be very advantageous, Comrade Kádár could talk about shared ideas and prepare the ground for the enlarged meeting of the Four.”19
DubcŠek was again evasive and again eluded his allies’ “embrace”. But now, in addition to the Soviet leaders, he was also avoiding Kádár. After DubcŠek returned from Brno, “he told me he could not meet Kádár. But he did not say why,” an annoyed Brezhnev said at the March 21 meeting of the CPSU CC Politburo.20 It was obvious that Kádár also took offense and abandoned his plan to visit Czechoslovakia. After all the delays, Moscow finally managed to organize a meeting of the “Six”. Oddly enough, DubcŠek, the chosen victim of the planned attack, was allowed to pick the venue. On March 19, 1968, Brezhnev sent word to Kádár: “He [DubcŠek] thinks that it would be best to meet in Dresden because he has never been to the GDR and it’s neutral ground, so to speak.”21
The question of who should attend the meeting again became a matter for speculation. It was not decided until the last moment whether or not to invite the Bulgarians. The Soviet party leader again shared his concerns with Kádár. “With regard to inviting Bulgaria, Comrade Kádár’s opinion was that the adverse effect on Romania would exceed the favourable effect on Czechoslovakia. Comrade Brezhnev agreed, and Comrade DubcŠek also had only the neighbouring countries in mind.”22 But, in the end, Todor Zhivkov had his way and was also present at this auto-da-fé.

For nearly two months after the Dresden conference of the “Six”, Brezhnev relied less frequently than before on Kádár’s services in bargaining with the Czechs and Slovaks. Throughout this period, consultation on the Czechoslovak question continued among the “Five”. It was the number one issue for the socialist countries. There was some realignment. Following the conference, Zhivkov wholeheartedly joined Ulbricht and Gomulka, who advocated a radical (“surgical”) solution and who were manifestly dissatisfied with the Kremlin’s hesitancy. In their eyes, by being the “odd man out”, Kádár proved himself to be
an utter weakling. At the same time, Brezhnev, by no means decided on the question of armed intervention at this time, seemed to make himself better understood when talking to Budapest.
Meanwhile, the Moscow hawks, including Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, and his associates, were not idle. A good many times they resorted to a frequently used method, that of intimidating their allies. On April 5, 1968, Fyodor Mortin, deputy head of Soviet intelligence,23 called on János Kádár in his office in Budapest, then flew to Zhivkov in Sofia. Simultaneously, “another responsible representative of the Committee [that is, the state security
committee, the KGB]” briefed Ulbricht, Gomulka, and DubcŠek. They were told of an alleged American “operational plan” of military intervention, prepared in 1962 which the “Soviet security organs obtained.” According to this secret document, probably devised by the KGB disinformation section, “Only an insignificant part of the population of Czechoslovakia will offer resistance to foreign troops: the party members, the party sympathizers, and those who rely on the Communist Party for their well-being.”24 This, too, was part of the Kremlin’s preparatory steps for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet general staff had been working on contingency plans for the invasion since the end of February 1968. The formal reason was that rockets with nuclear warheads were deployed—in the greatest secrecy—in Czechoslovakia. The contingent, which deployed them near the western border of the country, was too small to repel an expected attack by American and West-German diversionists. For this reason, the hawks in the Soviet Politburo almost automatically opted for a solution that had proved so effective in Hungary in the autumn of 1956. However, Brezhnev, who was more cautious than almost anyone else, would have preferred to invade Czechoslovakia “through the back door,” with the knowledge, and in fact, prior consent, of the Czechoslovak leadership. Therefore, they returned to the plan of trying to win over DubcŠek.25
On April 16, Brezhnev called Kádár again and told him that he “suggested to Comrade DubcŠek that they should meet in private, unofficially… He thought that he would give a political evaluation of the events based on Czechoslovak data, and if he meets with understanding on Comrade DubcŠek’s part, he will propose various steps for improving the situation. For instance, the holding of a joint Soviet, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish military exercise on Czechoslovak soil.”26 But, naturally, DubcŠek didn’t like the idea of the marshalling of troops that would have resembled the subsequent “Sumava” exercise. On April 25, Brezhnev defined for Kádár the tactic to be followed as follows: “The task before us… is to consider collectively before it is too late how to help Comrade DubcŠek and the healthy forces standing by his side.”27
Not counting the brief period around May 9, 1968—when the Soviet leadership was considering overrunning Czechoslovakia28—this stop-go tactic lasted up to early July. However, before the advocates of “surgical intervention” gained the upper hand in the Soviet Politburo, Moscow directed all its efforts to winning over the best known Czech and Slovak officials for the thankless job of restoring order while the “healthy forces” in Prague were on the defensive. At first they intended to entrust DubcŠek and CŠerník with the task, then
the otherwise constantly denigrated Smrkovsky (the speaker of the House, a reformist politician—because he made a very good impression on Brezhnev when they met in May and June.29 But by the
beginning of July it became obvious that the Kremlin’s emissaries in Prague and Bratislava could expect a positive response only from politicians like Drahomír Kolder, Alois Indra, or Vasil Bilak.30
Brezhnev expected the leaders of
the neighbouring countries to adopt the
CPSU’s frequently changing position on the Czechoslovak question. On June 12, he called Kádár asking the usual question, has the situation improved in Czechoslovakia? Then he gave new instructions: “We sincerely wish to help Comrades DubcŠek, CŠerník, Bilak (the last we consider a very honest and sober-minded man); it would be very important and we ask you, Comrade Kádár, to have a serious talk with Comrade DubcŠek, that he should assess the situation correctly, and recognize the dangers that threaten the CPCS, socialism, and himself as well (though this last question is of secondary importance, it has no bearing on the party’s fate who the CC first secretary is). We’d like to help him, too, which is why we do not publish articles that would make his position more difficult. However, we think that they should act with greater resolution, for example, by taking control of the propaganda agencies. We think that Comrades DubcŠek, CŠerník and Bilak should be prevailed on and advised to break with and distance themselves from the revisionist group, in which case the party’s healthy forces will support them.”31
In June, János Kádár and the Czechoslovak delegation led by DubcŠek (which was given a conspicuously warm reception in Budapest) had a several hours-long meeting at the Hungarian party headquarters on Jászai Mari tér. Kádár subsequently reported to Moscow what DubcŠek and CŠerník said in the talks, adding cautiously that perhaps it was not really expedient to criticize Prague as harshly as Pravda did in those days.32
In any other situation Brezhnev would have taken offense at such a comment, but now he let the criticism pass, offering only a few shallow demagogic arguments.33 This, too, indicated the great change in communication among the leaders of the socialist camp during these months. In the wake of Czechoslovak developments and Romania’s efforts to follow a separate course, Ulbricht and Gomulka sometimes spoke to Brezhnev in a condescending tone, raising their voices. DubcŠek, on the other hand, tried to gain time and room to maneuver by stubbornly adhering to old-style Byzantine homage practices. Zhivkov, on his part, refused to give up, praising the Russian Big Brother even in serious discussions which demanded concrete and concise answers.34
Kádár assumed a position somewhere in the middle: he expressed his own opinion coating it with praises of Soviet friendship.35 Otherwise they would hardly have excused him the demonstrative ceremony he organized for DubcŠek and CŠerník in Budapest at the end of June 1968. Astounded, Soviet Ambassador Fyodor Titov called the Brezhnev Secretariat’s attention to it. This notwithstanding, Brezhnev told Kádár in their next phone conversation that they in Moscow “…view the results of the Czechoslovak leaders’ visit in Hungary as very positive, they think it will be useful for C[omra]des DubcŠek, et al. They consider Comrade Kádár’s speech at the mass rally very positive: he found the appropriate form wherein he assured the Czechoslovak leaders of his support while also pointing out the dangers and the tasks on the basis of the Hungarian experience.”36
Kádár understood the message well: Brezhnev expected him to take a firm stand against the reform wing of the Czechoslovak leadership and “back” DubcŠek’s left-wing opposition. Kádár could not have thought the latter idea disagreeable in view of the fact that by then the HSWP leadership had for some time informal relations with the Prague and Bratislava conservatives. Two of the five signatories of the subsequent letter of invitation—Oldrich Svestka and Vasil Bilak—kept in regular touch with Hungarian diplomats and with officials visiting Czechoslovakia on the pretext of taking a vacation or for an exchange of views.

The information Kádár received in the first half of June did not fully convince him that the time had come for military intervention,37 but articles published almost simultaneously in Prague, did. Ludvík Vaculík’s manifesto, “2000 Words”, enumerating the democratic non-communist values of the Masaryk period, which caused quite a sensation even in Czechoslovakia, hit him and other HSWP leaders like a cold shower. Kádár took the other, an article by the eminent Czech historian, Machatka, commending Imre Nagy on the tenth anniversary of his execution, as a personal affront, virtually as a slap on the face.38
These two circumstances were Kádár’s psychological motive for giving in at the official negotiations in Moscow in early July. But on his return to Budapest he kept quiet about having given his consent to Czechoslovakia’s expected occupation. The report prepared for the HSWP CC Politburo—that is, for the party leadership comprising barely a dozen men—omitted the fact that in Moscow he voted in favour of armed intervention in the presence of Prime Minister Jenoý Fock, György Aczél, Kádár’s closest associate, a member of the Political Committee, and Károly Erdélyi, Deputy Foreign Minister, Kádár’s confidant and former secretary, a KGB agent. This would never have come to light had the working notes of the Soviet Politburo not been made accessible recently. The document, of which only one copy was made, strictly for internal use, contains the following: “Comrade Brezhnev said that during their last conversation he informed Comrade Kádár of the Czechoslovak situation and of our position. He said that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo is working on the letter to the CPCS Central Committee Presidium. He recounted what it approximately contains.
Comrade Kádár reacted as follows. He said that the document titled “2000 Words” is a counterrevolutionary programme aimed at overthrowing Soviet power, subverting the party, and turning its leadership over to the social democrats.

Furthermore, he said that, unfortuna-tely, even after this document [was published] the CPCS Central Committee Presidium failed to take firm action. It is employing methods that are ambivalent and inconsistent.
He agrees that the CPSU letter has to be sent. They, too, will draw up a similar letter addressed to the CPCS Central Committee Presidium in the forthcoming days.
Comrade Kádár agreed that the meeting of the Communist Party leaders of the socialist countries in the matter of the Czechoslovak question is urgent. He’s ready to take part in such a meeting at any time. In his opinion, a large delegation of Czechoslovak comrades should be invited to these talks.
Speaking about the Czechoslovak situation, Kádár then went on to say: the way the situation now looks, Czechoslovakia will probably have to be occupied. If this becomes necessary, we’ll go ahead without any doubt. He also said that they will discuss this at the [Hungarian] Political Committee meeting. But he is certain that the Political Committee will back his standpoint on this question.
Fock, Aczél, and Erdélyi participated in this discussion on the Hungarian side. Fock tried to say something, but Kádár cut him off by starting to speak, so he remained seated, pale and silent.
This discussion was very useful and, in my opinion, entirely frank…39

From that moment on Kádár could not retreat anymore. Although, as opposed to the position he took in early July in Moscow, he used a more conciliatory tone again at the beginning of the Warsaw discussions of the “Five” on July 13–14—under the influence of his Komarno meeting with DubcŠek and CŠerník, which he attended after he “checked with” Brezhnev over the phone.40 This was not a contradiction: Kádár knew that it was one thing to be a “hawk” in a closed circle in the Kremlin, and quite another to speak to a large audience. Furthermore, due to his talk, attempting to mediate with DubcŠek and CŠerník, he was late in arriving in Warsaw and, as a result, did not have a chance to sound out Brezhnev who had finally decided to take the “surgical” step against the Prague leadership. This was the main reason for Kádár’s ensuing very obvious isolation in Warsaw. He listened to the Polish, East German and Bulgarian party leaders’ pointed remarks with his usual, almost immobile expression. He became alarmed only when Brezhnev—for the first and last time in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis—publicly turned against him. Kádár quickly asked for the floor again and began to explain himself with unusual humility—a detail left out of his report prepared for the HSWP top leadership—and promised full support for the coming armed intervention.
Then he left for Budapest. All the way home he worried over not having noticed the change in the “line” in time. However, it was not in Brezhnev’s interest to offend Kádár and make him sulk, especially since he wanted to use him again during the impending intervention. He was aware that strong national unity was being forged around DubcŠek and CŠerník, who had pointedly stayed away from the Warsaw meeting, while the “healthy forces” were increasingly relegated into the background. The Kremlin needed to obtain a letter of invitation as soon as possible, in order to set the Warsaw Pact war machine into motion. The Soviet party centre’s
and the KGB’s joint plans called for Kádár’s participation in the “operational moves” to obtain such a document that had a mythical significance even before it was drafted.
Before this, Brezhnev demonstratively made up with Kádár. He had a ninety-minute friendly talk with him over the hotline connecting their offices. He acted as if nothing had happened. In fact, he stressed that at the CPSU CC plenum the day before “... he talked warmly about the speeches of the leaders of the fraternal parties, including Comrade Kádár’s, and particularly about Comrade Kádár’s second speech delivered after the Soviet delegation’s address.”
At this, speaking obliquely, Kádár himself mentioned the dispute he had had with Ulbricht and Gomulka in Warsaw: “Our situation with the Central Committee is not as simple as theirs. We weren’t enthusiastic in Warsaw and we could have given an answer to certain comrades.” Brezhnev, who really needed Kádár’s help now, spoke as if he had shown solidarity with Kádár in Warsaw. “Comrade Kádár, I would like you to know that we view your situation and position with great understanding, we value your speech in Warsaw highly, and we think that the leaders of certain fraternal parties should not do things in this way,” he said. “I think that we made this plain to them in our speech.”41
The events of the following few days were decisive in the history of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet party leaders, who assembled in the Kremlin on July 19 in order to prepare the operation, did not conceal their nervousness. Brezhnev admitted that the “healthy forces” kept retreating, “and are not likely to turn to us for help [on their own].” Premier Aleksei Kosygin expressed annoyance because Gomulka lacked sufficient men to take part in the “radical variant.” With elegant simplicity, Kosygin proposed that they blackmail DubcŠek: “We should let him know during a personal meeting or in some other way that we have in our possession material that incriminates him, Kriegel, and Císar. The KGB should prepare this and have it handy.”
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromiko, called Mr Nyet in the West, said: “There’s no danger of a large-scale war now. The situation is favourable in this respect. However, if we let Czechoslovakia go, others might be tempted, too. But keeping it will strengthen us. The international situation has nothing unexpected in store for us right now.”
Konstantin Katushev, the party leadership’s youngest member, the Central Committee secretary in charge of relations with the socialist countries, was also blunt: “Time is indeed against us. Naturally, DubcŠek, CŠerník, other rightists have to be disposed of [sic!]. We must prepare for the radical variant, and with meticulous care at that, on the assumption that they will not request help. In the course of the meeting with the Czechoslovaks they must be told when we’re going to make that decision. They must be told that we’re going to help the Czechoslovak people either with or without them.” 42
Pyotr Shelest was not present at this meeting, Brezhnev called the first man of the Ukrainian party organization, in the morning of July 20, 1968, in his office in Kiev and instructed him to leave for Hungary immediately, where he was to meet Vasil Bilak with Kádár’s assistance. By the time Shelest hurriedly packed after the brief phone call, a military cargo plane sent from Moscow awaited him at Borispol airfield and took off for Budapest at five p.m. He was accompanied by his secretary and several KGB officers, including a wiretap expert. For conspiratorial reasons Kádár’s car, rather than an embassy car, was waiting for the important guest at the Soviet airfield near Budapest43, and it took him to the Hungarian party headquarters instead of the Soviet embassy. Shelest informed Kádár, who was in all probability the first of the leaders of the “Five” to learn, that the final decision with regard to X-Day had already been taken in the Kremlin although still only in principle at that stage. Again, Kádár’s response was affirmative.44
Soon Brezhnev called Kádár again, talking in the usual roundabout way.

He expressed his deep gratitude to Comrade Kádár in the name of the CPSU leadership for his positive response in the matter at hand. This is so invaluable for our party and our friendship that there are no words for it. I will not forget it as long as I live.

Kádár’s answer was similarly oblique:

he informed Comrade Brezhnev that the said matter was going well: he mentioned Tito’s message, and that we convened the Central Committee meeting for Wednesday.45

Henceforth, Kádár was drawn ever more into the preparations for solving the “matter at hand.” In mid-August, the Soviet leadership even invited him to the Crimea where they discussed the minute details of the invasion. The Hungarian military and internal security machinery was also put in motion. Already on August 1, 1968, Interior Minister András Benkei sent instructions to a relatively wide circle of his subordinates concerning their duties in the event of a “radical solution” of the Czechoslovak crisis.
As soon as the armed forces of the “Five” crossed the borders of the So-
cialist Republic of Czechoslovakia late at night on August 20, Kádár’s importance
as a mediator diminished for the
Kremlin. The Soviet leaders gradually themselves took the initiative in Prague and Bratislava.46 Nevertheless, occasionally they resorted to Kádár’s assistance
even after Gustáv Husák’s succession to the head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.47

Notes

1 n Unger 1998: 34–35.
2 n Vondrová and Navrátil 1995: 162–163.
3 n Pataky 1993: 42, 54–69.
4 n Valenta 1991: 47, 78.
5 n DubcŠek 1993: 133, 135, 162; Williams 1997: 65, 84.
6 n Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Katushev, cynically remarked during a break in the meeting of the “Six” in Bratislava at the very beginning of August 1968, that the Soviet leadership deliberately used this ploy

7 n Dubcek 1993: 173.
8 n Vondrová and Navrátil 1995: 35-39.
9 n Pkhoya 288, file 47, unit 743
10 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743
11 n Based on a numbered xerox copy of the work notes of the CPSU CC Politburo, placed at my disposal by the Russian historian Rudolf Pikhoya, for which I wish to express gratitude. Rabochie zapisi 1968: 123.
12 n Rabochie zapisi 1968: 124–125.
13 n It was this that most angered the other opponents of the Prague Spring, too, who kept telling each other preposterous stories. For Instance, on April 17, 1968, Gomulka warned Soviet Ambassador Aristov that the “transformation of socialist Czechoslovakia into a bourgeois republic has already begun.” He urged Soviet intervention in order to prevent the fulfilment of “counterrevolutionary plans” in Prague. He told Aristov that the purging of the Polish party of “Zionist elements” was not yet complete, but already they had to face a new threat posed by the contagious Czechoslovak example. On May 21, Gomulka notified the Kremlin through the ambassador that a secret alliance was being formed between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. All three countries had links with the West, moreover, anticommunism is rampant in Czechoslovakia. “I don’t know how much of it is true,” Gomulka added, “but according to information available to us, nearly 200 communists have committed suicide in Czechoslovakia.” He told Aristov meaningfully that he, contrary to Kádár, recognizes the danger of counterrevolution in that country. The first secretary of the HSWP Central Committee, on the other hand, “continues to consider Comrade DubcŠek a politically reliable and mature leader.” True, during his, Gomulka’s, recent visit to Budapest, “Comrade Kádár mentioned to him that the elements of anarchy are conspicuous in Czechoslovakia, but it’s only temporary, and this country will not swerve from the socialist course. Moreoever, according to Comrade Gomulka, Comrade Kádár also declared in their talk that in the given circumstances it was hard to imagine the [Czechoslovak] communist party without DubcŠek.” According to the Hungarian ambassador in Prague, Imre Kovács, barely two and a half months later Kádár “no longer believed DubcŠek, who is said to be led by the nose by the rightists.” In Kádár’s view, in the case of DubcŠek we’re dealing with a clever Slovak peasant, who wants to lead the CPSU and all of us by the nose.” Bukharkin 1991.
14 n Hungarian politicians often called their colleagues in Prague “Czechs” even if they were Slovaks. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand—perhaps because it came into vogue at the time to use the term “Soviet nation”—preferred the term “Czechoslovak nation.”
15 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
16 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
17 n By this time, the leaders of the “Five”—including Brezhnev, in spite of the important part he had in Novotny’s removal—were very worried by the likely replacements in the Hradcany and the Czechoslovak government. Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko managed to persuade DubcŠek to negotiate with Novotny on March 11. Since the President’s personal secretary was a Kremlin plant, Brezhnev learned immediately what the discussion was about. He then directly notified Kádár: “In Comrade Novotny’s opinion, Comrade DubcŠek understands the situation, but for the time being cannot see a way out. He has no backers among the C[entral] C[ommittee] secretaries, and he gets no help from the Central Committee departments.
“The next Presidium session will be next week, and the Central Committee session is planned for the period after the party conferences. C[omrade] Novotny advised Comrade DubcŠek to convene the plenum only after the action programme is worked out to give them a platform for uniting C[entral] C[ommittee] members. According to the informer, Comrade Novotny is holding out and isn’t considering resigning. He would rather have the National Assembly remove him and leave defeated, than
capitulate. Comrade Brezhnev called Comrade DubcŠek in hospital this morning. He’s had a high temperature for two days (39ÞC/102ÞF), he feels a little better now. He informed Comrade Chervonenko, who was with him just then, about the state of things. It was noticeable that Comrade DubcŠek didn’t want to go into details over the telephone. His answer to Comrade Brezhnev’s straightforward question was that the nationwide situation has improved somewhat but it has deteriorated in Prague. He declared that the comrades are all working, but much work has to be done until the plenum, in order to be able to stabilize the situation.
“Comrade Brezhnev mentioned the plans pertaining to the meeting with Dubcek… Comrade DubcŠek was noticeably pleased by the idea, but did not give an answer, he will probably let Comrade Chervonenko know that, too.” (HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743) As so often before, DubcŠek tried to mislead Novotny and Brezhnev in respect of the “cadre replacements.” In March and April 1968, he approved, indeed initiated, almost every important removal and appointment in the party and state leadership.
18 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. Cf. Rabochie zapsi 1968: 124.
19 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
20 n Rabochie zapisi 1968: 124.
21 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. The Soviet leadership was surprisingly irresolute before the Dresden conference of the “Six.” Pondering how pressure could be exerted on DubcŠek, Aleksandr Shelepin proposed that Kádár inform them of his own negative experiences in 1956. “Our point of departure should be that we’re not surrendering Czechoslovakia to anyone,” Shelepin said. “DubcŠek is obviously a transitory figure. It is right for us to show resolution, but we must also consider how to proceed… We should be prepared to use radical methods, Novotny probably can’t be saved, but as long as they—he, Lenárt, and Lomsky—are [in position] we must somehow get them to turn to us for help before [the CC] meeting. Whatever happens, we would be in possession of their request. It’s clear that we must help. This help will sober everybody, first and foremost our enemies.” Pikhoya 1994; 13–14.
22 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. At the CPSU CC Politburo conference convened on March 25, immediately after the meeting of the “Six,” Brezhnev spoke much more openly than at the Dresden City Hall. He said that what irritates him the most is that the new DubcŠek leadership “undermined the foundations of the foreign policy that the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia hitherto pursued. Cadres are being removed in successive waves. It must be noted that 80 per cent of the removed cadres are people who had studied in Moscow. Could it be accidental that regional and district secretaries were resigning in succession?... Comrade CŠerník (the Prime Minister) came over to me during the break. He was bitter, and he said: “Why didn’t you invite us, Presidium members, to Moscow? Why didn’t you tell us these facts? Why didn’t you open our eyes?” Brezhnev also said that he had a word with Kádár, too, during the break, who seemed nervous at first, but “during our talk it became clear that he was fine and agreed with our speech.” Rabochie zapisi 1968: 149–154.
23 n His name was erroneously spelled “Martin” in the memorandum prepared for Kádár. HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. The key role this highly placed chinovnik played in the KGB is discussed in Andrew and Gordievskii 1990:538, 541.
24 n “In view of the highly confidential nature of the document, and of the importance of the channel through which the Soviet comrades received it, only the leaders of the five fraternal parties are informed. They leave it to Comrade Kádár to decide whom he’s going to take into his confidence in his immediate surroundings,” was the KGB’s request. HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
25 n Pikhoya 1994: 13–14.
26 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
27 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. Here the
CPSU leader still included DubcŠek among the “healthy forces,” indicating that the final decision on the tactics to be used against him had not yet been made. According to a memorandum dated nine days earlier, Brezhnev had then made a very different statement: “…very little was left of the trust he had in Comrade DubcŠek. Personally, he considers him an honest man, but doesn’t feel confident that he [Dubcek] will be able to master the situation.” NHA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
28 n Latis 1995: 311–312. Václav Slavík (a reformist secretary of the CC) remembers the date as May 9.
29 n Pikhoya 1994: 15–17. “Comrade Brezhnev judges the Czechoslovak situation to be very grave and complicated. He considers it a serious mistake that the rightists continue to control the means of mass propaganda… Recently, Comrade Brezhnev received the parliamentary delegation led by Comrade Smrkovsky. During the conversation, the Czechoslovak delegates spoke with tears in their eyes about friendship with the Soviet Union, what the Czechoslovak people owe the Russian people. Even before Smrkovsky returned home, he was being discredited and attacked directly in the press,” reads the June 22, 1968, memorandum prepared for János Kádár. HNA fonds 288, filel 47, unit 743.
30 n Valenta 1991: 140–144.
31 n That day, after his long monologue about the Czechoslovak situation, it seemed as if Brezhnev suddenly forgot what he was talking about with Kádár. He rambled on about how, after a difficult spring, “there has been plenty of rain, crops will be good along the Volga and in central Russia, sunflower,
sugar beet, cotton are abundant.” He complained that “crop prospects are very poor in Bulgaria,” as a result of which “Comrades [sic!] Zhivkov have already requested assitance.” HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
32 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. The cause of Pravda’s furious outburst was a theoritical study by Cestmír Císar (a reformist Secretary of the CC). It dealt with the application of the Marxist-Leninist idea under divergent “national” circumstances, listing numerous, what are considered today, dogmatic theses. At the time, however, it was a bombshell.
33 n “…Comrade Brezhnev said that the reason for publishing the article was that Císar offended not the CPSU but Marx and Lenin, which the CPSU as a Marxist-Leninist party could not let pass, because it would have met with incomprehension among its members. The whole article was devoted to Císar originally, but they changed that later.” HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
34 n Weit 1973: 195–214.
35 n Aleksandrov-Agentov 1994: 156.
36 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
37 n “The DubcŠek leadership can be seen to take several measures that may help them realize the correct course,” was how he occasionally defended the followers of “socialism with a human face” to Brezhnev. NHA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. Some Czech and Slovak conservatives shared Kádár’s opinion. One of the experts of the Hungarian party leadership “in charge of Czechoslovak affairs” at the time, the editor-in-chief of the party daily, Népszabadság, János Gosztonyi, arrived at the same conclusion when he recorded what his Czech colleague, Svestka, said on July 11, 1968: “…according to him, the situation in Czechoslovakia is not counterrevolutionary, on the other hand, they told the Soviet comrades several times that should it come to that, they still possess the force to face it, but if their forces were to fail to defeat a possible counterrevolutionary attempt, they would be the first to call in Soviet troops. …In answer to the question of what happens if the right-wing gains complete control, he said that in that case the danger of a split in the Party arises. He considers even the Party’s division into a Slovak and a Czech party disquieting. However, in his opinion, even if the right wing was to gain complete control, it would not automatically mean a counterrevolution and definitely not a bourgeois restoration. In his opinion, in this case something like the Yugoslav formation would be established, but of a definite anti-Soviet character.” HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
38 n Kádár protested against both writings in the name of the HSWP leadership in a letter addressed to Dubcek. HNA fonds 288, file 11, unit 2436. The Machatka article was very embarrassing for the CPCS leadership, particularly for the conservative forces and one of their influential representatives, Jozef Lenárt, who, as a CC secretary, was in charge of the Party’s foreign relations in the summer of 1968. This is what the information sent by the Hungarian chargé d’affaires in Prague to Budapest on July 9 refers to: “In connection with Comrade Kádár’s letter, Comrade Lenárt expressed indignation over the Machatka article, calling it shameful filth. He called the people in Prague cowardly and jittery, who don’t have the guts to react to the article. He added that they were already thinking of asking somebody from Új Szó [the Bratislava Hungarian language paper] to react. Comrade Lenárt continued this line of thought by saying that if a Czechoslovak leader were attacked in the press, there would be a great outcry right away. He stressed that similarly to the Machatka article, the answer, too, has to appear in the press [the Literárni listy]. He implied that a party-inspired reaction to the Machatka article was to be expected soon.” HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
39 n Rabochie zapisi 1968: 399–340.
40 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
41 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
42 n Rabochie zapisi 1968: 413–432.
43 n Shelest 1995: 346.
44 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743.
45 n HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 743. In the course of this conversation Brezhnev openly told Kádár that they must hurry because the CPCS Extraordinary Congress must not be allowed to convene. In his view, even the fact that the Dubcek leadership “agrees to certain replacements” became unimportant. “It seems,” Brezhnev said, “that in the end we’ll have to put into operation what is now being prepared. I see no other way out.”
46 n Even so, HSWP leaders occasionally gained unique information in Prague. Thus, for instance, in the morning of August 20, 1968, already, on the day of the famous CPCS CC Presidium session, Oldrich Svestka said that the “healthy forces” knew about Kádár‘s and Dubcek‘s negotiations in Komarno. Specifically, that the latter refused to yield, and that Brezhnev sent a stern letter to the CPCS leaders. Rudé Právo‘s editor-in-chief also alluded that the thing woud come to a head that day.
47 n For instance, in May 1969, on the eve of Husák‘s visit to Budapest, Brezhnev called Kádár and, since he wasn‘t in his office, left the following message: “Comrade Brezhnev told Comrade Husák plainly in Moscow that a troop withdrawal was out of the question now. Husák agreed and he, too, belives that the conditions do not yet warrant it. Comrade Brezhnev asks that should Comrade Husák raise this question here, Comrade Kádár is to convince him that it‘s not timely now.
“Comrade Brezhnev would like to call Comrade Kádár‘s attention to a second question. It is very important not to have the Czechoslovak comrades trust in ‘evolution’, but to persistently fight against the right-wing forces until they are completely crushed. Comrade Brezhnev thinks that Comrade Kádár‘s words will carry appropriate weight with Comrade Husák.” HNA fonds 288, file 47, unit 744.
 

Miklós Kun
teaches history at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. His field is the
history of the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries in Europe, on which he has published eight books. The present
article is based on a chapter of a book to be published both in Hungarian and English by Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.