| WHO ARE THEY? THE
RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN ESTONIA
Estonia is situated between
Russia, Latvia and the Finnish Bay. During this millennium, it has
been dominated in turn by Denmark, Sweden, the Teutonic (German) knights,
Poland, and Russia. After the First World War, independence was won
from a collapsing Russian Empire. It was to last, however, only for
two decades, as Estonia was forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union
in 1940. Fifty years of Soviet rule came to an end when Estonia declared
its independence in August 1991, thus restoring the former Estonian Republic.
The Second World War and
the forced integration into the Soviet Union led to vast demographic changes
in Estonia. In 1934, the population stood at 1.25 million, 88.2 percent
of which were Estonians. Russians made up 8.2 percent, Germans 1.5
percent and Jews, Swedes, and Finns the remaining 2.1 percent. The
war led to extermination of the Jews as an ethnic minority, and most of
the Germans and Swedes left the country, along with a large number of Estonians.
Soviet power brought massive immigration, and in 1989 the population stood
at 1.57 million, of which Estonians made up 61.5 percent. Russians
formed 30.3 percent, Ukrainians 3.1 percent, and Belarussians 1.8 percent.
The remaining 4.3 percent were made up of a mix of nationalities, mostly
from other parts of the Soviet Union (Raun 1991: 246–47). Some of
these people integrated into Estonian society, while others had closer
ties with the Slavic nationalities, using Russian as their main means of
communication. Thus, the people who are now grouped as Russian speakers
encompass a great variety of ethnic backgrounds, including both historic
minorities and people who arrived in three different waves of immigration
(Vetik 1995).
The first wave of immigrants
came in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, when industrial workers and Soviet
administrative personnel were sent to Estonia. These were mostly
from neighboring regions in Russia. The second wave, in the 1960s
and 1970s, consisted mostly of people from more distant parts of the Russian
republic. The third wave, from the end of the 1970s to the end of
the 1980s, brought immigrants from all parts of the Soviet empire.
The immigration was generally resented by the Estonians, who saw it as
an attempt at Russification. These immigrations, combined with memories
of World War II and the extensive deportations during the Stalinist period,
served to instill in most Estonians a deep resentment towards Russia and
Russians.
During Soviet times, both
Estonian and Russian were official languages, Russian being a lingua franca
which could be used anywhere. This did not encourage the immigrants
from other parts of the Soviet Union enough to learn Estonian or to acquaint
themselves with the local culture, and thus Estonians and Russian speakers
had little interaction. Most Estonians share a dislike of Russians
and ‘Russian culture’ and are eager to emphasize the differences between
themselves and the settlers (Kolstø 1996). Few Estonians have Russian
friends, and vice versa. Estonian children go to Estonian schools,
and Russian and most other non-Estonian children to Russian-language schools.
Before independence, “the whole life career of Estonians and Russians went
ahead separately: schools and universities worked separately in Estonian
and Russian languages, professional education was targeted towards different
sectors of the economy, mono-national working units prevailed, and so on”
(Helemäe and Saar 1995: 133). There were and are clear differences
between Estonians and Russian speakers in terms of place of residence and
type of employment. The Russian speakers mostly came to Estonia to
work in the industry, public service or the military forces, and they are
largely urbanized, with more than 90 percent living in cities or towns
(Rose 1995a). They make up half the population in Tallinn, the capital,
and form a solid majority in the industrial cities in the north-east.
Estonians, who dominated the agricultural and service sectors during Soviet
times, are in a clear majority in the countryside, and the Southern and
Western parts of the country.
In the political struggle
leading up to independence, the main frontlines ran between Estonian organizations
advocating autonomy and later independence, and organizations claiming
to represent the Russian speakers and fighting for a political continuity
with the Soviet Union. While the struggle for independence united
the Estonian people, it split the Russian-speaking part of the population.
The enthusiasm and dedication that drove the Estonian grass-roots movement
was missing on the anti-independence side, which was largely organized
by party officials and industrial leaders. As the struggle wore on,
a growing number of Russian speakers supported the move toward liberalization,
autonomy, and ultimately independence. In the referendum on Estonian
independence, held in March 1991, close to a third of them supported independence.
However, even though the declaration of independence in August 1991 was
supported by a solid number of Russian speakers, their situation deteriorated
during and after the struggle for independence. For many Russian
speakers who had not grasped the latent conflict, Estonian hostility came
as a surprise.
Following the independence,
the Russian speakers, formerly representatives of the dominant culture
in one of the world’s two superpowers, became a minority in one of Europe’s
smallest countries. After having partially dominated society, they
suddenly found themselves without political representation in a parliament
that passed laws against their interests. They became an underprivileged
minority overnight, in a small country with a hostile majority.
When independence was declared,
only a sixth of the Russian speakers living in Estonia received Estonian
citizenship automatically. These were former citizens of the first
republic or their descendants. The remaining Russian speakers were
defined as aliens, they suddenly faced the choice of whether or not to
apply for citizenship or residence permit. In order to obtain citizenship,
the applicant has had to live in Estonia a minimum of five years,1 take
exams on Estonian history and the Estonian constitution in the Estonian
language, and swear allegiance to the Estonian state. Many Russian
speakers experienced these demands as humiliating, and more found the practical
difficulties in learning the language and taking the exams insurmountable.
As obtaining Russian citizenship also required application, a great number
of Russian speakers in effect became stateless, and a majority of them
have remained so. Only Estonian citizens can vote and run in parliamentary
elections. Non-citizen residents can register to vote in local elections,
but only citizens can be elected. As a result, no parties seeking
to represent Russian speakers were registered for the 1992 parliamentary
elections, and thus no Russian speakers were elected. The Russian
speakers had practically no say in the formulation of the new legal system,
and many of the decisions made and laws passed were againist their interests
(Andersen 1997).
The language law of 1989
made Estonian the sole official language in Estonia. Subsequent legislation
introduced language proficiency tests which have to be passed to obtain
citizenship, or to fill positions in public service. Further, people
already working for the state are required to pass tests showing specified
levels of proficiency within stipulated deadlines in order to keep their
jobs. The language of communication with state agencies is Estonian,
and people who need the help of interpreters have to pay for their service
(Pettai 1996). ‘Estonianization’ policies have been imperfectly implemented,
however, partly because they would have left Russian-dominated cities without
essential staff. As a language, Russian has no special legal status,
and is officially considered a minority language along with Ukrainian,
Swedish, and Finnish. The only concession by the state authorities
is that one can communicate with the authorities in Russian in areas where
Russian speakers make up more than half the population.
In Soviet Estonia, Russian
speakers usually had better access to apartments and jobs in the well-paid
industry sector than Estonians (Helemäe and Saar 1995). In independent
Estonia they lost all such special privileges. The new laws on privatization
restored land and buildings to the former owners or their descendants,
who were almost exclusively Estonians. All inhabitants received privatization
coupons depending on how long they had worked in Estonia, but since only
citizens could buy land, most Russian speakers could spend their coupons
only on buying the flats they lived in, or buying shares in privatized
state enterprises (Andersen 1997).
In the new economy, heavy
industry, employing a large share of the Russian speakers, was hit particularly
hard by recession. While Tallinn saw quick economic growth and the
creation of new jobs, the Russian-dominated industrial towns in the north-east
experienced stagnation and a massive loss of jobs. In Narva, lying
on the Estonian-Russian border, only around half of the working-age population
have steady jobs (Boerefijn 1995). The Russian speakers are much
more prone to unemployment than the Estonians; lack of other skills
and proficiency in Estonian have closed opportunities for finding new work
(Rose and Maley 1994, Rose 1995a, Eamets 1995).
Before the independence,
Russian speakers tended to be more prosperous than Estonians but this has
been reversed since 1991. In addition to decreasing wages and more
limited access to the labor market, the Russian-speaking population has
a diminished arsenal of defensive economic means like savings (mostly wiped
out by the inflation in 1990–1992), aid from family networks, or plots
of land to grow food (Rose 1995b). As a result, the average Russian
speaker has seen his or her economic situation worsen compared to the average
Estonian. In making classifications according to sources of income,
benefits and other resources, Richard Rose found that half of the Russian
speakers fall into the categories vulnerable2 or marginal,3 while only
a fourth of the Estonians are classified so (Rose 1995a).
The period after independence
has brought many changes, and although both Estonians and Russian speakers
have experienced the positive and negative sides of the new system (Estonia
is now considered to have the most solid economy of the former Soviet republics),
the Russian speakers have been at a clear disadvantage.
THE RUSSIAN SPEAKERS’
IDENTITY
The non-Estonian or Russian-speaking
identity has no clear content, and is therefore difficult to refer to.
The group is bound together by two factors: the first is a negation,
the fact that they are not ethnic Estonians, and the second is their common
acceptance and use of the Russian language. Although the Russian
speakers include people of a number of nationalities, Russian is their
common language, and many of them, especially the Ukrainians and Belarussians,
have become Russified. However, the denomination ‘Russian speakers’
includes a large group of different peoples who share only the use of Russian
– far from being the ideal material on which a strong sense of identity
can be based.
Many of the Russian speakers
were born in Estonia, and more than ninety percent have lived in the country
for more than ten years (Rose 1995a). The ties to Estonia are stronger
among the Russians than among the other immigrant nationalities, as the
non-Russian immigrants started to come at a later stage. At the same
time the Russian speakers are being forced to adapt to a new Estonian society,
the contact with Russia is diminishing. Traffic over the border has
been declining, in part because of the trouble and expense of obtaining
a visa to cross the border, and the Russian speakers in Estonia are slowly
losing touch with everyday life in Russia. If this tendency continues,
personal ties with Russia will weaken. In the long term, the loss
of regular contact with Russia combined with increased interaction with
Estonians may contribute to the formation of a separate Russian or Russian-speaking
identity in Estonia.
Ethnic background is one
of the most important bases for identity-building and “an extremely powerful
mode of subjectivization” (Wæver 1993: 22), often the core around which
a person builds his or her identity. It is also the major basis for
state-building, and has the political advantage of reproducing the sense
of identity across generations in a more or less automatic fashion (Wæver
1993: 22). Also, “in crises involving a perceived threat to the unity
of an ethnic group, identity affirmation resolves internal stresses resulting
from political and social degradation of the group” (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross
1995: 357). It has been shown above that the Russian-speaking population
has experienced political and social degradation, which likely leads to
a cultural revival of their Russian identity. This assumption, however,
collides with two major obstacles – the ethnic heterogeneity of the Russian
speakers, and the de-ethnicizing effect of the previous Soviet regime.
Several writers contend that the settlers were not used to thinking in
terms of ethnicity – that the principal element of their identity was Soviet.
As Nikolai Rudensky writes, “[m]any Russians outside Russia never perceived
themselves as minority groups: just the opposite, they considered themselves
representatives of the dominant nation in a multinational state.
Thus, they displayed national loyalty neither to the republic of their
permanent residence nor to Russia, but to the Soviet state as a whole”
(Rudensky 1994: 63). According to Neil Melvin, “the core of the migrant
population was drawn from those sections of the Soviet population most
closely tied to the successes of the regime – industrial workers and members
of the military and security apparatus. They were largely rootless
in an ethno-cultural sense. Their migration to the Baltic region
was thus not Russian colonization in a new guise but Sovietization by a
Russian-speaking, de-ethnicized immigrant population” (Melvin 1996: 31).
In a 1986 survey, 78 percent of the Russian speakers identified with the
whole Soviet Union. Only 14 percent felt close to Russia and eight
percent identified with the Estonian republic (Melvin 1996: 36).
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the main source of identification
disappeared, and new sources had to be found.
As mentioned, the Russian-speaking
group is not a homogeneous body in terms of ethnicity. Thus, Russian-speaking
political leaders trying to mobilize the Russian speakers face the problem
of appealing either to a Russian identity and, by this, risking to lose
support of those who do not feel totally Russian; or to the whole
Russian-speaking group, but without being able to make use of nationalist
rhetoric. In addition, ‘Russian identity’, or the idea of what it
means to be Russian and who is included or excluded from the group, is
fairly unclear. Russian identity has never had clear geographic or
ethnic boundaries. The expansionist Russian state sought to incorporate
the peoples of newly conquered areas by spreading Russian culture all over
the empire. Tsarist and Soviet nationalities policies created little
sense of a well-defined ethnic or civic Russian nation. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, some 25 million Russians lived outside the Russian
Federation, and there were large non-Russian minorities within its borders.
In the words of Rudensky: “the largest European nation, with a record of
imperial domination, suddenly became a divided people with vulnerable peripheral
groups” (Rudensky 1994: 58). The first years of the Russian Federation’s
existence was marred by sharp conflict over Russian identity and foreign
policy. Nationalists and communists saw Russian ethnicity and the
old borders as the foundations for Russian identity and foreign policy,
while more Western-oriented groups presented Russian national identity
primarily in civic terms (Melvin 1996). Gradually, some sort of a
compromise was reached: the ethnic and civic definitions were fused together
in an ambiguous relationship. It has now become an uncontested principle
of Russian policy that the Russian communities are part of the Russian
nation and that the Russian state has a basic responsibility for their
well-being. For policy-makers in Moscow, the Russian diaspora also
includes Russified groups all over the former Soviet Union. “Russian
ethnicity and national identity have therefore been defined in terms of
an admixture of sociological, political, cultural-linguistic, and genealogical
definitions” (Melvin 1996: 22). Russia offers citizenship to all
former citizens of the Soviet Union. It is the only legal alternative
for the diaspora groups to express political allegiance, as neither the
Ukraine nor Belarus has shown inclination to support their own diaspora.
Since the independence,
Russian speakers have been much less organized than the Estonian population
(Ruutsoo 1993). During the Soviet period, Russian speakers were mostly
organized through the state, directly or indirectly. When the Soviet
state collapsed, so did many of the organizations. Of those that
survived, like the trade unions, most have seen a massive drop in their
membership. Of the organizations that are active, many are remnants of
the Soviet patterns of organization – veterans’ unions, trade unions, cultural
associations. Although the Russian speakers in Estonia are better
organized than in most other post-Soviet states (Kolstø 1996), they have
had difficulties in building up powerful new associations that can represent
them and provide them with clear alternatives. Membership in the
various associations is generally low, and out of three political parties
organized during the autumn of 1994, only two managed to secure the 200
signatures needed to register.
This organizational weakness
can be interpreted in various ways. It might be due to a lack of
leaders who can mobilize people, it may be the result of a disbelief in
the efficacy of organizational effort or an uncertainty as to which organizations
represent the Russian-speaking population. Melvin sums up a number
of factors that make new organizations and collective efforts problematic,
some of which have already been mentioned.4 First, the immigrants
were marked by a high level of mobility, and accordingly, a weak sense
of rootedness. They have difficulties in engaging in local community
discussion. Second, there have been continual waves of immigration,
breaking up traditional social networks. Third, the migrants are
an ethnically mixed group, consisting of not only Russians, but also Ukrainians,
Belarussians, Tartars, Jews, etc., which complicates the setting up of
organizations based on ethnicity. The migrants settled mostly in urbanized
areas, which increased their atomization and made it difficult to build
up social networks; and because they are geographically dispersed,
they have different regional characteristics and interests. A last
point is that in uncertain circumstances, the first priority is usually
economic security, not political action. This signals a tendency
towards atomization and individualization which makes collective efforts
– so important in the construction and maintenance of identity – problematic.
Whichever way one chooses to see it, the construction of a common identity
proves to be difficult under the circumstances.
Social surveys, though,
do reveal certain tendencies in the development of identities in Estonia.
While in 1986 most Russian speakers said that the Soviet Union was their
primary source of identification, eight years later the picture was radically
different. When asked in 1994 about how they think of themselves,
52 percent of the Russian speakers said they first and foremost identified
with their city or locality, while 32 percent mentioned Russia. Only
six percent chose the region or Estonia, and two percent the Soviet Union.
Ukraine and Belarus (potential ‘homelands’ to more than 12 percent of the
Russian speakers) were mentioned by three percent. When asked about
a second priority, 33 percent mentioned city or locality, and 41 percent
said Russia (Rose 1995a: 44). As a contrast, Estonians first and
foremost thought of themselves as Estonians, which indicates a less problematic
self-image. In a 1993 survey, 86 percent of the Russian-speaking
respondents thought that Estonia was very important to them, while two
thirds said the same about an indivisible Russian state (Rose and Maley
1994: 47). Thus, the general impression is that while Estonians have
a clear grasp of their identity and state loyalty, the Russian speakers
have a more ambiguous understanding of themselves and their situation.
Having lost the Soviet Union, it seems that most Russian speakers retreat
to localism for their primary source of identification, with the new Russia
coming in second. This may indicate that ethnicity is not as important
in this case as place of residence, although the low degree of identification
with Russia is not a well-founded basis on which any solid conclusions
can be drawn.
Russian cultural identity,
or the feeling of belonging to Russian culture, seems fairly strong among
most Russian speakers. The educational divide into Estonian and Russian
schools is still predominant, and it should be noted that proposed legislation
to remove Russian-language secondary schools has served to unite the Russian
speakers in protest. Even so, the Estonian authorities’ decision
to allow the establishment of a Ukrainian-language school in place of a
Russian-language one in 1996 caused serious concerns among Russian-speaking
politicians and the Russian speakers of different nationalities.
The role of religion should
also be commented on. As a group, the Russian speakers are more religious
than the Estonians (Rose and Maley 1994, Rose 1995a), and the majority
(55 percent) consider themselves orthodox (this also applies to seven percent
of the Estonians). For many, religious loyalty turned into a source
of ethnic conflict in the autumn of 1993, when a faction of the orthodox
church, dominated by Estonians, registered itself under the name of the
Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, and claimed to revert to the jurisdiction
of Constantinople instead of Moscow.5 This caused a split in the
church, as the remaining Russian-dominated part, under archbishop Cornelius,
refused to register under any other name, and the failure of registration
caused problems when former church property was reverted to the church.
The Russian-speaking population generally supported Cornelius, as was shown
by the participation of some 10,000 Russian speakers, the largest group
mobilized since the independence struggle, in a procession marching through
the old city of Tallinn.
Let us turn to political
allegiance and support for political regimes. When questioned about
their evaluation of the past and present regimes, Russian speakers generally
hold positive opinion of both the past Soviet regime and the present Estonian
state, but are strongly critical of the present government in Russia (cf.
Rose 1995a). Thus, most Russian speakers express a preference for
the Estonian government. Although they may have misgivings about
Estonia and its political leadership, Russia is not a positive alternative
for the majority of Russian speakers. During the last three years
of the Soviet Union, the Russian-speaking population showed increasing
support for Estonian independence. Between April 1989 and September
1991, the proportion of Russian speakers supporting independence rose from
five to 55 percent (EMOR-polls) and at present very few Russian speakers
oppose the existence of the Estonian state.
In addition to preferring
the Estonian political system to the Russian, most Russian speakers wish
to be included in the new state. In a 1994 survey made by an advisor
to Boris Yeltsin, a majority (58.3 percent) of Russian speakers that are
not Estonian citizens said they wished to obtain Estonian citizenship.
This indicates a willingness to transfer their political allegiance and
limit their identification with Russia to an ethnocultural level.
In the same survey, 13.5 percent said they preferred dual citizenship,
something the Estonian constitution does not allow. Only 3.9 percent
claimed they wanted to apply for Russian citizenship (Estonian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 1995). This corresponds with other surveys that
indicate that most Russian speakers want Estonian citizenship. However,
the number of people going through the naturalization process has remained
low because of the difficult requirements. Russian citizenship, on
the other hand, can be obtained through a simple procedure. As a
result, the political loyalties of the Russian-speaking population, as
they are expressed through citizenship, seem confused. Around a fourth
of the Russian speakers now hold Estonian citizenship, and roughly a fourth
have become Russian citizens. This leaves more than half in limbo,
in the position of being ‘stateless’. As shown above, acquiring Russian
citizenship does not necessarily imply close affinity to the Russian state,
nor does it necessarily entail a wish for reunification with Russia.
For most the decision was made out of a desire for the security that citizenship
offers, and it was easier to get Russian citizenship than going through
the ordeal of applying for the Estonian. This assumption is supported
by the fact that most of those who chose Russian citizenship are elderly
people living in the north-east region (Vihalemm 1996). As such,
Russian citizenship for many was a choice of convenience, and not necessarily
a statement of political allegiance.
As could be expected, the
majority of Russian speakers feel connected to Russia, but they also hold
high opinion of the Estonians, a feeling that is not reciprocal.
Sixty-nine percent of the Russian speakers say they have a lot in common
with Russians while only five percent of Estonians say the same.
Twenty-eight percent of Russian speakers say they have much in common with
Estonians, 46 percent say they have some things in common, and only eight
percent say they have nothing in common (Rose 1995a: 30). Most Russian
speakers give clear indications that they are attached to Estonia, and
think of it as their homeland. Around a third of them were born in
Estonia, and most have lived in Estonia for more than 20 years. To
break up and go somewhere else would be a major step, and only a small
minority is contemplating such a move.
The Baltic republics were
among the better functioning areas of the Soviet Union, and Russians tend
to think of Baltic peoples as organized and hard-working. In the
words of Kolstø: “The Baltics are probably the only region in the former
Soviet Union where many local Russians are apt to see the indigenous civilization
as equal or even superior to their own” (Kolstø 1996: 625). This
positive evaluation should make it easier for the Russian speakers in Estonia
to accept their demotion from the top position in the ethnic hierarchy
than it is for Russian settlers in Kazakhstan or other former Soviet republics.
Although Estonians are generally eager to point out the differences between
them and the Russian speakers, according to recent social surveys, the
two groups are surprisingly alike in terms of values and opinions held.
There are systematic differences between them, as Russian speakers have
more positive feelings toward the old regime, they are more leftist in
their political views and more critical to the laws and regulations that
relate to citizenship and language. Still, the differences are minimal:
in average, two-thirds of both groups hold similar views on most political
issues, except citizenship (Rose and Maley 1994, Rose 1995a).
Estonian sociologists Kirch,
Kirch, and Tuisk focus on the rootlessness of the Russian speakers, saying
that these people simultaneously consider themselves as representatives
of Estonian, Soviet and world culture (Kirch, Kirch, and Tuisk 1992: 15),
which indicates a weakness in the Russian part of their identity.
They argue that the local Russian-speaking community is too scattered to
become a source of social identification, and conclude that the most significant
basis for social identification is the denomination ‘Baltic Russians’.
This assumption is supported by my personal experiences and various interviews
with Russian speakers. Although most of them make it clear that they
feel Russian, they also say that they feel different from ‘Russian Russians’.
They have taken up many ‘Baltic’ traits, especially in terms of work ethic
and the belief in organized society, and often speak of Russians in Russia
as being lazy, disorganized and arrogant. Most seem to think that
they would find it problematic to adapt to Russian society. In the
words of Melvin, they have become ‘Balticized’.
It is difficult to make
any definite conclusion based on the material at hand. What seems
clear is that the Russian speakers have lost their major source of identification,
the Soviet Union, and, as a group, they have not made a definite choice
about what will replace it. Although the Soviet legacy was to a large
extent connected to Russian culture and language, this does not mean that
the Russian Federation is the automatic successor as an identification
source. Melvin sums it up: “At present most Russian speakers have
great difficulty identifying themselves with any particular culture.
Multiple and often competing identities are therefore found among the settlers.
The minorities tend to view themselves as being simultaneously representatives
of overlapping Baltic, Soviet, Russian, and world cultures. In terms
of self-identification, the settler communities are not as yet ethnic-based
minorities. Being a Russian speaker continues to form the main substance
of their identity” (Melvin 1996: 27).
GOALS AND STRATEGIES:
THE EXPRESSION OF IDENTITY?
Given the problematic identity
of the Russian speakers, it is interesting to look into the political strategies
they follow. Are they united in their political preferences?
The term strategy is here used in the sense of patterns of actions taken
and plans made in order to achieve a certain goal. Strategies can
be followed by both individuals and groups, but they are politically relevant
only when they are represented by a large number of people. These
patterns can be organized around a central leadership, or disorganized,
due to the spontaneous actions of many individuals.
In addition to the factors
mentioned above, evaluations of the economic future is also of importance
in the forging of political strategies. Since 1991, the economic
situation has been uncertain for a great number of Russian speakers and,
as mentioned above, the economic development has been disadvantageous to
the Russians-speakers as a group. Even so, most Russian speakers
are optimistic about the future, and it is fairly predictable that their
economic situation will be better in five years time (Rose 1995a).
At the same time, evaluations of the situation in Russia are negative,
and most Russian speakers doubt whether they could find work and a place
to live in Russia. Most believe it to be to their personal advantage
to stay in Estonia, and therefore to adapt to the new circumstances.
Most respondents believe that there is no alternative to a market economy,
and that Estonia is on its way toward economic growth. It seems safe
to assume that economic prospects play an important role in people’s evaluation
of the situation, and that their decision to remain in Estonia and adapt
to Estonian society is based on the belief that in the long run, it will
be to their personal advantage. This may have an effect on their
sense of belonging, as time spent in a place contributes to a perception
of rootedness. On the other hand, such an economically based complacency
may turn out to be problematic if the Estonian economy does not live up
to what it seems to promise.
The strategies listed below6
form the most obvious alternatives for the individual Russian speakers
and organizations representing them:
a) Emigration – leaving
Estonia,
b) Irredentism or separatism
– illegal confrontation with the Estonian state,
c) Confrontation within
the Estonian state apparatus – protesting with the limits of the law,
d) Cooperation within the
Estonian state apparatus,
e) Integration into Estonian
society,
f) No action.
Support for the different
strategies has been measured through actions, like leaving the country,
taking Russian or Estonian citizenship or taking part in demonstrations;
through voting, both in Russian and Estonian elections; through social
surveys; and through the general development as described in the
press and other publications.
A. Emigration
Since 1989, the Estonian
proportion of the total population has increased, as a net immigration
turned to net emigration, and a significant number of Russian speakers
left the country. Between 1989 and 1995, the number of Russian speakers
sank by 12 percent. Combined with extremely low birthrates, this
meant the number of total inhabitants sank by 4.7 percent. Most observers
assume that those who left were the least integrated into Estonian society,
thus leaving those best prepared to adapt to the new reality. This
exodus reached its peak in 1992, when more than 30,000 people left the
country. There was little organized activity supporting the migration
among the Russian speakers, but nationalist Estonians set up an organization
for decolonization, aiding Russian speakers who wanted to leave the country.
There was also some organized activity in Russia offering aid to the immigrants.
Since 1995, the outward flow has reduced to a trickle, and surveys indicate
that most of the remaining Russian speakers plan to stay in Estonia.
There are clear differences
between the nationalities in terms of emigration. Between 1989 and
1995, the number of Jews and Germans sank drastically (by 38 percent and
50 percent, respectively), as they moved to Israel or Germany. The
remaining nationalities did not have such attractive ‘homelands’.
Eighteen percent of the Ukrainians left, and 17 percent of the Belarussians.
At the same time, the number of Russians declined by only ten percent,
indicating that the Russians are more rooted in Estonia than the other
nationalities. On average, Russians have lived longer in Estonia,
and the number of second and third-generation settlers is higher than among
the other nationalities. In addition, the larger number of Russians
may diminish the sense of isolation felt by the members of smaller groups.
B. Irredentism or
Separatism
Irredentism, or the wish
to join the national ‘homeland’, has not been strong among the Russian
speakers in Estonia, but there is a vociferous minority that does not accept
Estonian statehood. In addition, Estonia has played an important
part in Russian domestic politics, as several political groups refuse to
accept, or are hostile toward Estonian independence. Most parties
have accused Estonia of violating the Russian speakers’ human rights, and
the Russian Duma has repeatedly called for economic sanctions against Estonia.
A number of leading Russian politicians have expressed hostility towards
the Estonian state as such,7 and Russian irredentists or separatists in
Estonia have a strong support within the Russian state. Inside Estonia,
the main political forces among the Russian speakers, the Joint Council
of Working Collectives and the Interfront, were opposed to Estonian independence
until the bitter end. They were both prohibited after the failed
coup of August 1991, together with the Communist Party. The anti-independence
forces never regained their power after this, and within the Russian-speaking
population, the support for Estonian independence grew steadily.
Although in present-day
Estonia it is difficult to run organizations that oppose Estonian independence,
there are several ones on the borderline of doing so. The most important
is the Russian Citizens’ Rights Movement, founded by Yuri Mishin.
The organization is strongest in Narva, the largest Russian-dominated industrial
town in the north-east. It has worked to convince Russian speakers
to take Russian citizenship and organized demonstrations and other anti-Estonian
actions. Mishin himself claims to have 35,000 supporters, although
the Russian Consul General in Narva contradicts him, saying that the supporters
are few and mostly old veterans. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs estimates that five percent of the Russian speakers hold extremist
views (The Baltic Times 1996).
The city council of Narva,
with more than 90 percent Russian speakers, have several times declared
its autonomy within the Estonian state. In July 1993, it organized
an unauthorized referendum on local autonomy, which was supported by 97
percent of the voters. The turnout was low (54 percent), however,
and the Estonian authorities claimed that there were irregularities.
The failed putsch in Moscow in October the same year robbed the city council
of support from Russia. In addition, the law on local elections states
that only Estonian citizens can be elected to local councils. The
number of citizens was very low, and included none of the incumbent city
councilors. Using a special paragraph in the law on citizenship,
the Estonian government awarded citizenship to moderate Russian-speaking
leaders, ensuring that there was some political alternative. As could
be expected, moderate forces took over after the elections, and the quest
for autonomy in the north-east region ended.
Since 1992, Russian speakers
have been able to take Russian citizenship, and thus take part in Russian
politics (the votes cast in Estonia are counted as being part of the Vsevolozhsky
area in the St. Petersburg region). The electoral turnout in Russian
elections has been low among the Russian citizens in Estonia, indicating
that only a part of those who have taken Russian citizenship are genuinely
interested in politics. In the 1993 elections, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal
Democratic party was the most popular, but the turnout was low and the
number of Russian citizens limited (less than 40,000). In the 1995
elections, the turnout was also low: 22 percent. Of those who voted,
more than 60 percent supported parties that were skeptical to Estonia’s
right of existence. The Communist Party received 30.5 percent, Russian
Communities (Lebed) received 22 percent, and Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic
Party 8.6 percent (The Baltic Independent 1995).
As it is today, very few
Russian speakers oppose Estonian independence, and the quest for local
autonomy has lost support.8 Most Russian speakers think that they
are much better off living in Estonia than they would be in Russia (Rose
1995a). Thus, the basis for Russian nationalism and consequent irredentism
or separatism is limited to nationalist fervor and a nostalgia for the
past, and is contrary to pragmatic actions to improve the lot of ordinary
Russian speakers.
C. Confrontation
within the System
The possibilities for confrontational
actions within the system are limited, as only citizens can vote in parliamentary
elections, and citizens have to swear allegiance to the Estonian state
(except those that received citizenship automatically). Most potential
supporters for parties advocating a confrontational line will not obtain
Estonian citizenship, and are therefore limited to express their political
opinion in local elections, where all residents can register to vote, but
only citizens can be elected. The confrontational line has been represented
by the Russian Council, set up in 1993. It is a Russian nationalist
organization, claiming to protect the cultural rights of the Russian minority.
It has close connections with the Russian-Orthodox Church in Estonia, and
although it claims to support other nationalities as well, it is purely
Russian nationalist in its rhetoric. In the local elections in 1993,
the Russian Council’s list in Tallinn, Revel,9 won 10 out of 64 seats in
the city council. Towards the end of 1994, the Russian Party in Estonia
(RPE) was organized to take part in the parliamentary elections.
Together with the United People’s Party (UPP, see below) it formed an election
list which won 5.86 percent of the votes (around half the Russian-speaking
voters), and six seats. In the local elections in 1996, RPE’s list
won 11 seats in Tallinn. Although the confrontational line is represented
in parliament and in local councils, its political impact has been very
limited, as no Estonian parties cooperate with them (Daatland 1997).
Thus, the idea of confrontation within the system has severe limitations,
as Russian nationalists and radicals are unlikely to aquire Estonian citizenship,
and have the possibility to vote. Confrontational parties may win
support in the local elections, but as the Estonian parties show no inclination
towards cooperation, their political impact will continue to be negligible.
D. Cooperation within
the System
Russian moderates were active
in the Estonian independence movement, and set up the Russian Democratic
Movement (RDM). This, in turn, organized the Representative Assembly,
a parliament-like construction that was to represent the Russian-speaking
minority. However, Russian nationalists refused to join, and instead
set up the Russian Council (see above). In 1993, RDM organized the
election list Our Choice, which won 17 seats in the Tallinn City Council.
The RDM later formed the basis for the United People’s Party (UPP), a moderate
left-wing party devoid of the nationalist rhetoric characteristic of the
RPE. The two parties together won six seats in parliament in 1995.
In the 1996 local elections the UPP fared badly, and won only five seats
in the Tallinn City Council, indicating waning support for the moderate
Russian organization.
Like the more confrontational
line, the cooperational line has also failed to score any major concessions
from the Estonian authorities, and the Estonian parties refuse to cooperate
with their representatives. This strategy has also achieved little.
Estonian concessions are few, and generally the result of international
pressure rather than the work of the Russian parties. As a political
movement, it only attracts a small part of the Russian-speaking population.
E. Integration into
Estonian Society
Those who accept the Estonian
state and its policies, may choose to integrate into society, to learn
the Estonian language, and assimilate to Estonian culture. These
people tend to act within Estonian parties and organizations and support
integrative measures.
A number of Russian speakers
took active part in the independence movement, and many more supported
it. A third of the Russian speakers voted for Estonian independence
in the referendum in 1991. In the parliamentary elections of 1992,
no Russian parties took part, and the Russian speakers who had a right
to vote were left with a choice between Estonian parties. They mainly
gave their support to leftist or centrist parties that advocated a moderate
approach to the question of nationality. The first Estonian parliament
had only one Russian-speaking delegate, a substitute MP for the Social
Democratic Party. In the parliamentary elections of 1995, around
half the Russian-speaking voters supported Russian parties, while the rest
gave their votes to Estonian parties (assuming that the turnout of the
Russian speakers approximated the average turnout). Russian names
appeared on several party-lists, but no Russian speakers were elected for
any of the Estonian parties.
In opinion polls, most Russian
speakers agree that it is important to learn Estonian (Rose 1995a), but
after a peak in 1992, attendance at language schools has decreased (Pettai
1996). As pointed out above, most Russian speakers feel that they
have a lot in common with the Estonians, and show a clear intention to
adapt, but Estonians in turn have shown few signs of welcoming them.
Thus, integration is problematic. Younger Russian speakers, however,
tend to adapt more easily to the new situation: they learn Estonian in
school, and since their school exams count as language exams, acquiring
Estonian citizenship becomes much easier for them (Daatland 1997).
F. No action
More than half the Russian-speaking
population have no citizenship. Although a fair number of people
indicate that they would like to take Estonian citizenship, few take any
action to achieve it. In most social surveys the Russian speakers
are markedly less decided on any issue than the Estonians. The ratio
of people who answer “don’t know,” or take up a neutral position is consistently
higher among the Russian-speaking respondents than among Estonians.
The Russian speakers are also reluctant to organize themselves. In
1994, the two Russian parties only slightly passed the 200-member limit
necessary for registration.
Most experts comment on
the Russian speakers’ lack of action. Only a small majority engage
in political and organizational activities, while the large majority seem
to be content with living their lives and letting Estonian society develop
in its own way. The no action strategy seems to be the most appealing,
which can be an indication that people are content with the situation,
or that they do not feel they have any political efficacy. Judging
from the Russian parties’ lack of political success, the difficulties in
obtaining Estonian citizenship, and the general development of post-Soviet
Estonia, it seems clear that the lack of political initiative is largely
due to the limited possibilities for real political action. The problems
listed above also deserve repetition: the Russian speakers’ high
level of mobility and weak sense of rootedness; their weak social networks,
due to continual waves of immigration; their ethnic and social heterogeneity;
their urbanization; their geographical dispersion; and last,
but not least, the priority given to economic security instead of political
action in uncertain circumstances. In addition, several of the strategies
listed above contradict each other. The relationships between the
leaders of the Russian-speaking community have been far from amicable,
which splits those who engage in political activities. The Russian
nationalists, both irredentists and confrontationalists, have often gone
as far as calling those advocating cooperation or integration traitors,
and cooperationists and integrationists have responded in a similar manner.
All these factors combine to make organized political activity problematic,
especially as the Estonian authorities have given little attention to the
integration of the Russian speakers. Although the majority of Russian
speakers seem to have chosen no action, this is partly due to the failure
of the other possible strategies, and partly to the large number of factors
that impede organized political action.
In addition to the dicussion
of the various strategies, some further tendencies should be commented
on. In a 1992 survey, Kirch, Kirch and Tuisk found notable differences
between the degree of adaptation of Russian speakers living in different
regions (Kirch, Kirch and Tuisk 1992). Using a combination of responses
given in the survey, they constructed an index of integration in Estonian
society, finding that Russian speakers adapt and integrate the most easily
to Estonian society in areas where they are in a clear minority.
The least integrated was the population in the almost purely Russian-speaking
north-east.
There are also clear differences
between the age groups. There is a strong tendency among young Russian
speakers to feel more at home in Estonia, while the elderly feel more uncomfortable.
Only a tenth of those between eighteen and twenty-nine have taken Russian
citizenship, as opposed to a fourth of the total Russian-speaking population.
While half of the Russian speakers over sixty had no knowledge of Estonian,
this only applies to a tenth of the young. Three quarters of the
young say they regard Estonia as their country, while only a fourth of
the elderly claimed the same. Forty-two percent of the Russian citizens
are pensioners over the age of sixty, and the great majority of the Russian
citizens admitted that they asked for Russian citizenship because they
did not want to be without citizenship, and Estonian citizenship is more
difficult to get. Two thirds of the young say they want to apply
for Estonian citizenship (Baltic News Service 1996).
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS:
UNCLEAR IDENTITIES, DIFFERING STRATEGIES, AND POLITICAL IMPOTENCE
The Russians-speaking minority
has not chosen a single path based on a common identity and a unitary interpretation
of their situation. Instead, there are deep splits within the Russian-speaking
group in terms of their interpretation of the situation, their national
and political identity, and the strategies followed. Around a sixth
of the non-Estonian population in 1989 have left the country. Of
the remaining, a fourth have taken Russian citizenship, and another fourth
are Estonian citizens. The rest seem to have adopted an attitude
of wait-and-see. This has split the political forces of the non-Estonian
population, and the result is political impotence. Although they
make up a third of the population, Russian speakers do not have a say in
Estonian politics, and the failure to forge a common strategy makes it
doubtful that they will have considerable impact in the near future.
As a group, the Russian
speakers show willingness to adapt to Estonian society, and to live by
the new rules. Their intentions, however do not correspond with their possibilities
and capabilities. While most Russian speakers think it is important to
learn and speak Estonian, it is only the younger generation that is actually
doing so. This is probably also due to practical difficulties, as
it is very problematic for middle-aged and elderly monolingual non-academicians
to learn a new language. The younger generation study Estonian in
school, and are generally more adaptive, indicating that an improvement
of the situation will come. In general, the contact between Russian
speakers and Estonians is very limited. This is not only due to intransigence
on the side of the Russian speakers. Estonian authorities have done
little to encourage or help those who wish to adapt, and Estonians show
little interest in integrating the Russian speakers into Estonian society.10
The future development,
in terms of identity and political strategies, is uncertain. Most
Russian speakers share a sense of Russian-ness, although it is unclear
what this entails, and what kind of political consequences it will have.
Writing about the Russian speakers in Latvia, Pål Kolstø says that:
“Whether in time [the Russian speakers] should come to regard themselves
as Latvians of Russian extraction or as Russians who happen to be living
in Latvia will clearly influence political relations both within and among
the Soviet successor states.” (Kolstø 1996: 609). This applies equally
to the Russian speakers of Estonia, but this article has shown that it
is far from certain that they will eventually form a single and uniform
idea of who they are and what they should do. Rather, it seems probable
that the Russian speakers will remain divided, forming various identities
and corresponding strategies.
REFERENCES CITED
Andersen, Erik André‚ (1997):
The Legal Status of Russians in Estonian Privatization Legislation 1989–1995.
In Europe–Asia Studies, 49(2): 303–316.
The Baltic Independent,
No. 295, December 22, 1995 – January 11, 1996.
Baltic News Service, January
3, 1997.
The Baltic Times, May 16–22,
1996.
Boerefijn, Piet (1995):
The City Between Two Towers. In The Baltic Independent, No. 299.
Daatland, Christer (1997):
From Confusion to Clarity? A Study of the Influential Factors Behind the
Estonian Party System. Graduate thesis, Department of Comparative
Politics, University of Bergen.
De Vos, Goerge A. and Lola
Romanucci-Ross (1995): Ethnic Identity: A Psychological Perspective.
In Ethnic Identity – Creation, Conflict and Accommodation. George
A. De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross eds. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.
Eamets, Raul (1995): What
about Unemployment? In Baltic Review, 7: 23–25.
EMOR Social Surveys.
Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (1995): Attitudes, Surveys, and Opinions. In Reflections
of Estonia, 9. Internet Information (http//www.vm.ee/reflecti/1995/95ree09.html)
Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (1996): In a Sharp Voice: Russian Statements against Estonia,
Part 2. In Reflections of Estonia, 16. Internet Information
(http//www.vm.ee/reflecti/1996/96rus16.html)
Helemäe, Yelena and Ellu
Saar (1995): National Reconstruction and Social Re-stratification.
In Nationalities Papers, 23(1): 127–139.
Joeste, Marje et al. eds.
(1993): Eesti A&O. Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus.
Kirch, A., M. Kirch and
T. Tuisk (1992): The Non-Estonian Population Today and Tomorrow:
A Sociological Overview. Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Science.
Kolstø, Pål (1996):
The New Russian Diaspora – An Identity of its own? Possible identity Trajectories
for Russians in the former Soviet Republics. In Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 19(3): 609–639.
Melvin, Neil (1995):
Russians Beyond Russia. The Politics of National Identity. London:
Chatham House Papers.
OMRI News, January 6, 1997.
Pettai, Vello (1996):
Estonia’s Controversial Language Policies. In Transition, 29 October
1996, 20–22.
Raun, Toivo U. (1991):
Estonia and the Estonians. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
Rose, Richard and William
Maley (1994): Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study.
In Studies in Public Policy, No. 222.
Rose, Richard (1995a): New
Baltics Barometer II, A Survey Study. In Studies in Public Policy,
No. 251.
Rose, Richard (1995b): Micro-Economic
Conditions of Baltic Nationalities. In Studies in Public Policy,
No. 254.
Rudensky, Nikolai (1994):
Russian Minorities in the Newly Independent States: An International Problem
in the Domestic Context of Russia Today. In National Identity and
Ethnicity in Russia and the New States in Eurasia, Roman Szporluk, ed.
London: M.E. Sharpe.
Ruutsoo, Rein (1993): Transitional
Society and Social Movements in Estonia 1987–1991. In Proceedings
of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, Humanities and Social Sciences, 42(2):
Vetik, Raivo (1995): Ethnic
Conflict and Accommodation in Post-Communist Estonia. In Journal
of Peace Research, 30(3): 271–280.
Vihalemm, Triin (1996):
Integration or Marginalization: Which Direction Do the Everyday Coping
Strategies of the Estonian Russian-Speaking Population Lead? Paper delivered
for a seminar on minorities in the Baltic states, arranged by the University
of Bergen, Norway, August 1996.
Wæver, Ole (1993): Societal
Security: the Concept. In Identity, Migration and the New Security
Agenda in Europe, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre
eds., 17–64. London: Pinter Publishers.
1 From 1992 to 1995, the
period of residence required was two years.
2 Vulnerable: Income
is limited to earnings from regular jobs, benefits at place of work, or
pension.
3 Marginal: Income-producing
economic activities are limited to growing food, repairing family houses,
and using ‘connections’ through the help of friends and relatives.
4 Listed by Neil Melvin,
London School of Economics, at the conference Russians Outside Russia at
the Central European University, Budapest, 14–15 April 1996.
5 The Estonian Apostolic
Orthodox Church lay under Constantinople’s jurisdiction from 1923 until
the Soviet occupation. The leadership of the church fled to Sweden
in 1944, and maintained its organization.
6 The list is inspired by
Triin Vihalemm’s paper, and a later conversation with her at a conference
on minorities in the Baltics, in Bergen, Norway, August 1996.
7 During the run-up to the
presidential elections in 1996, Gennady Zyuganov, the presidential candidate
of the Communist party said in an interview with Newsweek: “The Baltics
received nothing from God, neither natural resources, nor good forests,
except sand and the sea. Everything they have now, they got from
Russia.” Alexander Lebed, another important candidate warned that
“Russia will take immediate military action, should NATO expand to the
territory of the former Soviet Union. Estonia will have no future
[if it joins NATO].” In an interview with Postimees, Estonia’s largest
newspaper, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the extreme nationalist
Liberal Democratic Party was quoted as saying: “I’m telling you honestly
that I’m doing everything to liquidate the Baltic States” (all citations
from Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996).
8 The already cited report
from Emil Pain, an Advisor to Boris Yeltsin, stated that 66.3 percent of
the Russian-speakers in Estonia did not wish to see the Soviet Union restored,
and 74.6 percent were opposed to the idea of Estonia or parts of Estonia
being subjugated to Moscow. 3.5 percent wanted a restoration of the
Soviet Union, and 18 percent thought that a union with Russia and other
republics of the former Soviet Union would be the most favorable future
for Estonia. 59.4 percent thought that independence was preferable,
and 9.1 percent supported union with Western Europe (Estonian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 1995).
9 The old Russian name for
Tallinn.
10 Having lived in Estonia
for a year, teaching at the University of Tartu, I found that very few
of my Estonian friends and acquaintances have friends among the Russian
speakers, and vice versa. While my Russian friends generally spoke
of Estonians positively, the Estonians were mostly negative when talking
about Russian speakers. Of course, Estonians have all reasons to
resent the Soviet occupation, of which the immigration of Russian speakers
was an important part.
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