Imre Lakatos
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) was a pivotal figure in 20th century philosophy of science. Although he was a rationalist, he appreciated opposite views as well, such as findings in the history of science that undermined the logical positivist and Popperian conceptions of science: conceptions about the growth and rationality of science. In its earlier issues, Replika has already devoted thematic sections to Popper's and Feyerabend's philosophy of science (see 17-18 in 1995 and 13-14 in 1994, respectively). Lakatos was closely associated with both of these thinkers. He was a renegade student of Popper, just like Feyerabend, of whom he was both friend and fierce oppponent. 

Everyday forms of resistance
As Tibor Dessewffy, the editor of this section explains in his introduction, there are two aims to be achieved with this collection of essays. On one hand, it was Replika's intention to introduce the work of political scientist and anthropologist James Scott to the Hungarian public. As Dessewffy argues, however, Scott is not simply an “emerging American classic" who should be known in Hungary in order to catch up with recent developments in Western social sciences. Scott's notion of everyday resistance can be extremely important and useful in understanding Hungarian social changes under both state-socialism and post-communism. One of the most painful problems for Hungarian social science (and to be sure, in other academic communities as well) is to detect “invisible" or, with Scott's word, “hidden" socio-economic processes. Scott's studies of course can not bestow upon empirical results concerning the Hungarian situation, but his writings provide a theoretical toolkit, which might be very useful in analysing (post)communist social changes. Scott's non-positivistic methodology and the elegance of his arguments are also relevant to consider in the survey-dominated Hungarian social science.

This thematic section contains four articles. Two of them are written by Scott himself. The first is a chapter from his classic book: “Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts." Here Scott criticises Gramsci's notion of “hegemony" and its implication that people live with false consciousness when they accept their subordination. Although dominated people, on the surface, seem to follow “the agenda of the powerful" in their social interactions, it does not mean that they are not able to use strategies of resistance “under the table" in times when surveillance is overwhelming. The second piece offers an inventory of the different forms and practices of everyday resistance in different social and historic contexts. The third article is a comment written by historian Charles Tilly, who expresses his appreciation for Scott's work but also suggests some interesting points for further consideration. In the fourth essay, the Hungarian historian, István Rév, discusses various forms of everyday resistance, as practised by Hungarian peasants during the Stalinist fifties. Rév, somewhat self-critically, also warns us to avoid the pitfalls of giving a heroic description of the actions of the atomized peasants. Instead of idolising a self-conscious political opposition to the state by the “nation" he proposes to settle with a more down-to-earth, realistic vocabulary.
 

What is history or sociology good for?
In 1990, already in its very first issue, Replika called for a reconsideration of the crucial uestions of Hungarian sociology by sparking off a debate about social structure. In the following years, the field of social mobility and the investigations of poverty came to be reinterpreted. Another dispute that stretched across several Replika issues tried to clarify the “cognitive chance" of Central-European social science. A number of papers appeared in Replika about the professionalization of sociology and about the nature of the specificities of measurement in social sciences.

The present issue joins in with a thematic section on the history of sociology in Hungary. It starts with József Saád's article, “History of Hungarian Sociology: The History of What?" which ignited a lively discussion. Saád claims that a contiguous and coherent historical elaboration of the theme in the title is still missing, owing primarily to the ambiguity of the subject. It is not quite clear the history of what is at issue: 1. an analysis of social thinking in terms of the sociology of knowledge and/or history, 2. the review of sociological thinking in terms of the history of ideas, 3. the historical elaboration of social and/or sociological theories, or 4. the elaboration of sociology as a discipline in terms of the history/sociology of science.

In his contribution, titled “What's a History Good for?", Dénes Némedi argues that an emerging interest in the classic authors reveals an identity crisis within national sociological traditions. Whenever a clearly defined subject-matter and a set of uniform methods, which can be adopted by the majority of the sociological community, is lacking, scholars turn towards the past to achieve professional security. In this regard -- paradoxical as it may appear -- the researcher of Hungarian sociological history fares better than his colleagues absorbed in a study of the history of German, French (or Anglo-Saxon) sociology with their sacred traditions, since not being obliged to reinterpret the sacred tradition, s/he might stand a good chance of carrying out a real historical analysis of scientific institutions and ideas.

In his “History and Identity", László Kupa differentiates three kinds of sociological history: histories of ideas, of institutions, and of science. In his view, works lacking originality must also be considered as components of “normal" scientific activity. Consequently, a study of the history of Hungarian sociology in the last century ought not to be restricted to a reinterpretation of celebrated authors but should also cover the work of “second line" thinkers.

In his polemic piece, “Sociological History: The History of Sociology," Endre Nagy discusses the problems of the historiography of sociology from a “post-positivist" position, relying on J. C. Alexander. He rejects the views which, thinking in terms of the dichotomy of theory vs. empirical research, reckon with sociology proper from the appearance of empirical experience, dating the beginnings of the discipline in Hungary to the 1840s. In the theoretical debates of Replika the author seems to discern signs of a post-positivitistic turn in which “the `trumpets of interpretative sociology' may rock the walls of Jerico of positivist empiricism".